Certain mathematical, statistical, logical, and philosophical issues at the foundations of mathematical modeling  by Loase, John Frederick
CERTAIN MATHEMATICAL, STATISTICAL, LOGICAL, AND PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES AT THE FOUNDATIONS 
OF MATHEMATICAL MODELING 
John Frederick Loase 
Westchester Community College, Valhalla, N.Y. 
Iona College, New Rochelle, N.Y. 
Abstract. The basic constructivist goal is that mathematics concerns itself with the 
precisedescription of finitely performable abstract operations - albeit hypothetical 
computations within the set of integers. Modern probabilists take little interest in the 
soundness or even the computability of the probabilities with which they deal according 
to Bishop (1970). 
This paper will examine several foundational issues in mathematical modeling from a 
constructivistic perspective. 
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INTRODUCTION 
For the constructivists, mathematics describes or 
predicts the results of certain finitely 
performable, albeit hypothetical computations 
within the set of integers according to Bishop 
(1970). Although such methods do not lead to 
contradictions, it is not clear how much of 
classical mathematics may be developed from a 
constructive philosophy. 
A problem from probability theory that illustrates 
foundational problems in classical mathematics is 
the Birkhoff ergodic theorem. This theorem asserts 
that if T is ameasure-preserving transformation on 
a finite measure space and f is an integrable 
function, then the averages 
f"(x) = 1 
n 
(f(x) + f(Tx) + . . . . f(T"x)) 
converge as n 3 0-a for almost all x. For a 
counter-example, take T to be the rotation of the 
unit circle through an angle 2 iT d , where Q( is 
any real numbir, perhaps 0, perhaps irrational. In 
one case j f j would converge a.e. to fI on the 
other to the constant function (2rr)'I/ f(e) d8. 
Thus a constructive proof of Birkhoff's theorem is 
impossible stated Bishop (1970). A similar 
in which a sequence of real numbers ij;tqncesthat
converges classically but not 
con!!tructively, is obtained by letting f r 1 be a 
monotone, non-decreasing sequence of real Rumbers, 
each of which is either 0 or 1. We cannot rule out 
the possibility that some r is 1. This sequence 
classically 
$;?:~$T~s1970). 
but not constructively 
Central Limit Theorem 
One of the most important theorems in statistics is 
the central limit theorem. Usually proof of the 
CLT involves independence and randomness 
assumptions concerning the random variables X 
. . ..x n. a' x? Withoukindependence assumptions we c nno 
write Mx(t) =;z Mxi(t) and derive the standard 
result known as the central limit theorem. 
Hypothesis testing uses Z or t distributions, both 
based upon independence assumptions and results of 
the central limit theorem. Linear regression 
assumes that YL, YK . . ..Y are the observed values 
of a set of in epe dent ra%dom variables. 
The independence assumption is one of the focal 
points of modern statistics. Our faith in the 
validity of statistical results is highly dependent 
upon the degree to which data conforms to this 
assumption. 
The normal curve's development, according to Cowle 
and Davis (1982), is traceable to DeMoivre's 
Ooctrine of Choice, a gambling manual first 
published in 1733 DeMoivre used the normal curve 
to approximate the sum of a very large number of 
binomial terms, It is safe -to say that our 
pervasive dependence upon the normal curve and 
independence assumptions in the physical and social 
sciences is based upon the neatness of binomial 
probabilities. 
The notion of statistical dependence has received 
scientific attention in recent years. 
. . . X be random variables. They are :Iidxii i$ 
assocfated if for every component wise non- 
decreasing functions f and g cov 
:1">1'$b.(X?! ?)";,en we say that 
If for X = (X 
iscpk?tivdly ubper orthant dependent. 
results in probability and statistics have been 
derived under the assumption that some underlying 
random variables are associated; however, the 
validity of the proofs may be violated if one 
assumes PUOD. Thus, it is recommended by Shaked 
(1982) that various notions of positive dependence, 
which are "between" association and the orthant 
dependence notions (and also arise in applications) 
may be useful. 
Suppose we are concerned with a covariance 
stationary discrete-time stochastic process. For a 
covariance stationary process, we denote the 
covariance and correlation between Xi and X 
Cj and Pj. 
itj by 
P 1 'i i*i 
j 
j fli* 6;:; 
If we treat simulation output data as if they were 
independent, the sample vat-dance is no longer an 
unbiased estimator of d L. Thus if Pi =- 0, 
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S2(n) will have a negative bias - a bias that will 
usually lead to serious errors in analysis 
according to Law and Kelton (1982). 
Sometimes one attempts to estimate the P.s from 
data XI, X2 . . . X,. This might be helpful i&.-order 
to estimate c2 
t! %I . 
We could estimate 
p,.= a4 
where __. 
52(n) 
However, this estimate ?:'i; biased, has a large 
variance, and is correlate% with other correlation 
estimates. Consequently, accurate estimates of P. 
will be difficult to obtain unless n is very large.J 
A recent result concluded that certain dependent 
sequences of random variables conform to a 
functional C.L.T. Let (X_) be a sequence of random 
variables with EX,,"mt:, E 'i~~,Xi,;/~ 3 r~-"~o 
Also supn m E (2 
, ;-ml 
Herrndorf (1984) proved the functional C.L.T. for 
(X,,) under assumptions on o<n(K) = sup{lP(AnB) - 
P(A)p(B)(: 
and the as)rmptotic behavior 
some~jC(1,co). 
of 11 no/la for 
It is unclear how this result would transfer to 
simple hypothesis testing (t or z testing) in which 
individuals or treatments interact. What, for 
example, would be an appropriate test of difference 
between means if there was a departure from 
independence in either or both of the samples? 
Continuity of the Real Number Line 
Betrand Russell (1903) probed the foundations of 
mathematics in Principies of Mathematics. He 
stated that attemots to eauate J ii with Dedekind 
cuts or convergent sequences of rationals were 
problematic. He asked, "Do the irrational numbers 
truly exist or are they merely a convenient fiction 
that ease certain algebraic and geometrical 
arguments?" 
Wittgenstein objected to Russell's logistic thesis 
that mathematics is logic, feeling that Principia 
Mathematics has corrupted our thinking both in and 
about mathematics. Wittgenstein remarked, "Logic 
as the foundation of all mathematics does not work 
and to show this it is enough that the cogency of 
logical proof stands and falls with its geometric 
cogency." This was reported by Kielkopf (1970). 
In light of the constructivistic thesis (the 
antithesis of Wittgenstein's reliance 
geometrical intuition) Russell's caution regardi:: 
the existence of elementary irrationals, like 
fl* appears sound. 
We do not have a means of developing the digits of 
the elementary irrational 6?- from a polynomial 
function with rational coefficients. Let me 
demonstrate: 
and assume that we can 
%in:%e =bt~"aP$?*~~ xr in the following 
manner: 
f(x) = a0 + aIx t a2x2 + . . . . anxn 
ao, aI, a2 . . . . a, integers 
f(1) = bI(mod 10) 
f(2) = b2(mod 10) 
f(k) = bk(mod 10) 
dK & 1. 2, 3. . . . . 
We will obtain a contradiction because f(a + 10) 
I f(a)(mod 10) 
Va c N (Elementary Number Theory) 
Similarly, if we used composite functions f(g(h)) 
. . . . . f,g,h with rational coefficients, similar 
results could be demonstrated (Loase, 1985). 
In modern mathematics, we find the recoaxnended 
mathematical procedure for computing real numbers 
to be Dedekind cuts. That is, we may show that a 
sequence may converge to fl yet be useless for 
computing the decimal expansion of IT because we 
have no way of determining the error. 
Rqnz (1985) observes that for apb > 0: a<$? if 
a c 2 and fi<b if 2 < b . This enables us 
to locate fl as Dedekind cut in the rationals 
by the following. 
(1.1414)2< 2 4 (1.1415)2 
The error estimate is explicit: we know E to 
within a ten thousandth. 
The only problem with Renz's analysis is that we 
are assuming that c exists. We cannot 
generate the Kth digit of -rrT from any 
polynomial function or K-finite composite 
polynomial functions with rational coefficients. 
As a result we don't know if we are harboring 
contradictions in the domain of irrational 
numbers - the domain that is critical for the 
continuity of the real number line. 
Peano Arithmetic is intended to describe the 
sequence of natural numbers, its axioms and 
elementary principles of addition and 
multiplication as well as statements connected with 
mathematical induction. Zermelo-Fraenkel Set 
Theory is a much stronger system than Peano 
Arithmetic and according to Boolos (1984). almost 
all known mathematics can be derived from ZF. It is 
currently regarded as the standard system of set - 
theory. 
Let us examine how fi is derived from Zermelo- 
Fraenkel Set Theory. 
4 
. / 
lL 7-i 
Let L = 3 x (_ Rationals 1 x i 0 or xl0 and 
x252 1 
Let M = ix C Rationals 1 x2i2 { 
There can be no rational number25 corresponding 
to this cut. If there were 4 - 2, and this is 
impossible. 
Once we construct the real number system we may 
define Dedekind cuts of reals. We simply say that 
if (f, i) is a Dedekind cut of reals, then there 
exists a real number A which is an upper bound of 
L and a lower bound of M, according to Hayden and 
Kennison (1968). 
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In developing fi from Dedekind cuts we are 
assuming that we can dichotomize the real number 
line and that th_ere exists a real number_which is an 
upper bound of L and a lower bound of M. Also we 
are assuming that each rational is a member of 
either L or M. Dedekind cuts appear to conflict 
with the basic constructivistic goal - that 
mathematics concern itself with the precise 
description of finitely performable abstract 
operations (which reduce to operations with the 
integers). 
One way of extending the ratio als to a larger 
system of numbers, including lt+ is "algebraic 
extension." Take the ring of polyndials a, + aIx + 
..,. a x", a. t rationals and form2the various 
remainders obtained upon division by x - 2. These 
remainders will be of the form a + bx. a,b 6 
rationals. Here "x" will play a role exdctly like 
fl -a field whose elements could be designated 
a+bfl . However, in constructing fl this 
way, it makes no sense to say that the algebraic 
number n is greater or less than any given 
rational according to Lennes (1973). 
The alternative description of real numbers is in 
terms of "Cauchy Sequences" of rationals. If n is a 
positive integer, then fl - L< 6 There 
exists a rational number A, 3 $- l/n < A,< d? 
(Zermelo-Fraenekl Set Theory). This followed from 
Dedekind-complete 
:I Ba c F with 4 < B =>Fdaartd D f;:;d;t ;;; 
+&<actl anddC b< 8. This result was 
reported by Hayden and Kennison (1968). The only 
problem is assuming that iJ?- exists at all: 
,J-r -l/n C d7 . 
Let us examine one approach to mathematical 
statistics in which we do not have to consider the 
continuity of the real number line. 
Let us assume that the random variable X possesses 
the density function f(x). Let us test the 
hypothesis Ho: & = E, vs. HI: 6 = f,,f,. 
Let 2 represent the median of X. Let a random 
sample be denoted by XI, . . . . X,. Since P (X 
> &, 1 Ho) = l/2, P(Xi - E o > D 1 Ho) 
= l/2. i = 1, 2, . . ..n. 
0 , 
Let Zi = Xi-f c-o 0 
1,X -z. >'J 
i = 1, 2, . . ..n 
The 3's are independent identically distributed 
random variables. When H is true E(t.) = I/2; 
therefore when H is tr& the i's rebresent a 
Bernoulli variableowith P = l/2. 
Choose Z = 2 z as our statistic for 
constructin$cihe te:t, and we should use the right 
hand of the distribution of t as critical region. 
Here 
E(Z) = np = n/2 
V(t) = npq = n/4 
In order to avoid continuity assumptions, we must 
not use the normal approximation to the binomial 
distribution in which the critical region 
T)T, where P(T>To) = K and where T = 
?Y n 
Instead we must find an integer Z. satisfying 
and such that no smaller integer will satisfy the 
inequality. The critical region will be the region 
where t 5 Z according to Hoel, Port and Stone 
(1971). In thys way, we have avoided any implicit 
assumptions related to the continuity of the real 
number line. 
If we were to use the normal approximation to the 
Binomial distribution we are using t - values that 
reflect the area under the normal curve. The area 
under the curve is calculated using continuity 
assumptions of the real number line. 
Those mathematicians who still reject Cantor's 
theory of transfinite numbers must also reject 
large parts of classical mathematics, especially 
those involving irrational numbers. 
Lennes (1973) writes: "The Continuum hypothesis is 
not only independent - it is simply meaningless. 
Since a meaningless proposition cannot be proved 
from any set of axioms, and since its negation is 
also meaningless, then any meaningless proposition 
is independent of any set of axioms. 
Certainly fl can be computed to any degree of 
accuracy but that does not prove that fl 
exists. Similarly the area under the standard 
normal curve can be computed to any degree of 
accuracy but is the real number line continuous? 
There are many implicit assumptions underlying the 
calculus. 
Since the set of all real numbers in the interval 
0 4 X4 1 is non-denumerable (cannot be placed in a 
l-l correspondence with the natural numbers), we 
denote the transfinite number of this set C and 
refer to it as the cardinal number of the 
continuum. The continuum hypothesis stated that C 
is the next transfinite number after X (cardinal 
number of the natural numbers). Godel tonjectured 
that the denial of the continuum hypothesis is also 
consistent with the postulates of set theory. In 
1963 the continuum hypothesis was proven 
independent of the postulates'of set theory by Dr. 
Paul Cohen, (Eves and Newscm, 1965). 
It is unclear as to the implications of the 
continuum hypothesis for analysis. In analysis we 
use continuity assumptions in order to calculate 
integrals. 
For example let us examine how the normal 
distribution is developed. In order to develop the 
distribution function of the normal curve we 
consider 00 
J -e -x2 242 dx = 1 -4 
The calculation of this integral required 
continuity assumptions as related to 
/X2/2cr2 for - 00(x<.-. 
In intuitionistic mathematical philosophy, the 
completeness of the reals cannot be established. 
Cantor's hierarchy of transfinite cardinals is 
rejected and so are certain basic properties of the 
real numbers. 
According to Cantor, w, the least transfinite 
ordinal number which is greater than all finite 
numbers, is to be regarded definite and completed - 
like -fl . This transfinite number w has no 
more trace of the numbers which tend to it than 
fl has of the approximating fractions. The 
transfinite numbers stand or fall with finite 
irrational numbers, for both are definitely marked 
off modifications of the actual infinite (DeLong, 
1971). 
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If the irrational numbers fall, then the continuum 
loses its continuity; continuous probability 
distributions would then need different 
mathematical interpretations - interpretations 
radically departing from classical continuous 
probability distributions. : 
While no one would dispute the accuracy of the 
calculations of areas under the normal curve, the 
continuum upon which the calculations depend 
represents a Kierkegaardian "leap of faith" from 
the elements of number theory. We should be made 
explicitly aware of this quantum leap. 
Please understand that, at present, no proof that 
the mathematics for which we are trying to give a 
foundation is itself consistent. The most 
promising developments in mathematical foundations 
are yet to come according to Hatcher (1968). 
Axiom of Choice/Implicit Assumptions 
Frequently we have no way of knowing the 
population, population mean, or population variance 
and we estimate the population mean and variance 
from sample data. We are assuming that there 
exists a population from which the sample is drawn 
and that the population has well-defined properties 
including a probability distribution. 
In set theory the general choice axiom states: If a 
set S is divided into a collection of mutually 
disjoint non-empty subsets A, 8. C . . . . there 
exists at least one R which has as its elements 
exactly one element from each of the subsets A, B, 
C . . . . . 
In statistics we are assuming something very close 
to the converse of the axiom of choice in assuming 
that, given the subsets X., there exists a well- 
defined population P from dhich the sample Xis are 
a subset. 
Let us examine a mathematical example which 
demonstrates the problematic nature of the axiom of 
choice. 
Let S be the set of all real numbers X such that 
o-cx<I. Decompose S into subsets by putting 
into the same subset all members of S which differ 
from one another by a rational number. We will 
create a collection of subsets of S which are 
mutually disjoint and non-empty. Without employing 
the axiom of choice there is no way of 
demonstrating the existence of a set R containing 
exactly one number from each of these subsets. 
Some mathematicians, notably members of the 
intuitionist school of philosophy of mathematics, 
deny the mathematical existence of a set if there 
is no known way of ascertaining the members of the 
set. A set is a fit subject for mathematical 
investigation only if a rule of construction is 
given which yields the members of the set. Any 
statement which deals with a set whose claim to 
existence is not validated by this stringent 
criterion of construction is not acceptable as a 
mathematical statement according to Eves and Newsom 
(1965). The above set would not exist in an 
intuitionistic mathematical philosophy. 
Let us examine an example from elementary 
statistics. We may want to compare food prices in 
two cities. One develops a list of n food items of 
various types and obtains prices from the newspaper 
ads for a supermarket chain with a store in each 
city. One may then use the Z test for the 
difference of the means. 
However, we have made several implicit assumptions. 
We have assumed that the population of food items 
is well-defined. This is problematic since many 
items that are considered food to consumer A may 
not be considered food to consumer 8. Also we are 
assuming that there exists a non-ambiguous entity - 
food price. All we can say is that we have defined 
the current price of certain items by what a single 
supermarket is charging. Also how do we choose the 
items? How do we choose the supermarket? 
Lastly, how do we know that there exists a well- 
defined population of food prices for each city? 
Would we take an average of every price on a 
particular item in an entire city to arrive at each 
food price and then enumerate all food items in 
each city? 
Let us examine a simple test of hypothesis: H : P 
= P2 /HI: PI # P2, where PI and P2 a& th& 
probabilities of success in two different 
experiments. 
Let Z = 
We can choose an appropriate critical region. 
However, we are assuming that N N 
sufficiently large to insure a c&od ?iorr$ 
approximation to the corresponding binomial 
variables, also that the two sample success ratios 
?I = XI/n1 and 92 = X2/n* are independently, 
normally distributed with means PI and P2, 
variances PI(l-PI)/NI and P2 (I-P2)/N2. 
Also we Are pAstulating H is true and that the 
P is therefo?e normally distributed 
%"E&'b,-vagiance PI(l-PI) + P2(1-P2) 
-- 
"1 "2 
We are positing that if by assuming H is true and 
deriving a contradiction (that is a z'value in the 
critical region) then H is true (Hoel, Port, and 
Stone, 1971). Therefor@ we are using reductio ad 
absurdum reasoning in testing hypotheses. If we 
employ intuitionistic logic P or not P demands a 
general method which for any proposition P yields 
by specialization a proof of either P or its 
negation. If we do not possess such a method of 
construction we cannot assert the principle of the 
excluded middle according to Heyting (1976). The 
intuitionistic "counter example" to the law of the 
excluded middle starts with a proposition P 
asserting "X = 0" where: 
X = l/n if, in the nth decimal place in the 
expansion of F , there commences (for the first 
time) a sequence of exactly 7 consecutive 5's. 
X = 0 if there is no such sequence of exactly 7 
consecutive 5's in the decimal expansion of -i-r .
If the decimal expansion of TT is a random 
sequence, the probability that a sequence of 7 
consecutive 5's would not appear in the first K 
digits of such an expansion tends to zero with 
increasing K. Under such circumstances one could 
quite reasonably assert X = 0. The objection to the 
counter example would rest on firmer ground, 
according to Lennes (1973) if based on the 
intuitionistic perspective that infinite decimals 
considered in extenso are meaningless. 
An example might clarify the intuitionistic 
perspective. 
prime such that 
Let 1 be defined as the rza;e;: 
(g-2) is also a prime, or 
such a number does not exist. Intuitionists reject 
such a definition since we don't know if the set of 
FOIJNE 
twin primes is finite. An integer is 
intuitionistically well defined according to 
Heyting (1976) only if a method for calculating it 
is given. 
To return to our original test of hypothesis, 
(please pardon the abruptness), how could- we 
demonstrate that the random variables were normally 
distributed, as assumed? The usual procedure is to 
employ a goodness of fit test in which we partition 
our data into j intervals and use the test 
statistic. 
X2 = $_ (N. - np.)* 
j=l npj 
However, there are no definite prescriptions for 
choosing the intervals. In reality, H will 
probably never be literally true. Furth&more, 
goodness of fit tests are not very powerful. Some 
such tests, Anderson-Darling and Cryer-Von Mises, 
are usually more powerful than the X test. We may 
conclude that goodness of fit tests are only 
capable of detecting fairly gross disagreement 
between the data and the fitted distribution (Law 
and Kelton, 1982). 
There are many mathematical philosophical issues 
underlying mathematical modeling. Harvard's 1984 
International Conference on Thinking and the 1985 
International Conference on Mathematical Modeling 
(U of California - Berkeley) have provided forums 
that have featured joint disciplinary approaches to 
the solution of complex problems. Perhaps 
interdisciplinary foundational scrutiny of 
mathematical modeling may minimize, even eliminate, 
the antinomies that inhere at the foundations of 
statistics. Such an enterprise would be in harmony 
with the spirit of Bertrand Russell's attempt to 
firm the foundations of mathematics in Principia. 
There are no more fundamental mathematical 
philosophies than the constructivistic or the 
intuitionistic from which to proceed. 
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